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Abstract: We consider the impact of taxes on the quantity and quality produced of goods, 
such as wine, for which market value accrues with age by a competitive producer. Any 
pair of taxes that includes a volumetric sales tax and any one of three other types of tax – 
an ad valorem sales tax, an ad valorem storage tax, or a volumetric storage tax – spans 
the full range of feasible tax revenues with positive tax rates. For any tax system that 
reduces quality relative to the firm’s no-tax equilibrium, there is another tax system that 
increases tax revenues, eliminates the quality distortion, and does not increase the 
quantity distortion. Many wine industry observers believe that most, if not all, existing 
tax systems tend to result in the suboptimal provision of quality.  Our results suggest that 
the wide variety of wine tax systems is not prima facie evidence that these systems, or 
most of them, are inefficient. Provided the system includes a volumetric sales tax it may 
be efficient, regardless of which of the other instruments, or how many of them, are used. 
Assertions regarding inefficiency must be evaluated on an empirical case-by-case basis. 
Our analysis provides a theoretical framework for such research. 
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Wine Taxes, Production, Aging and Quality 
1. Introduction 
The tendency for an excise tax to increase the average quality of a consumed good is 
often referred to as the Alchian-Allen effect (Alchian and Allen, 1964).
1 Barzel (1976) 
explained this effect in terms of product attributes; an ad valorem tax is based on all 
product attributes, while an excise tax affects only certain product attributes. Many 
authors have refined and expanded these initial analyses (Gould and Segall, 1969; 
Borcherding and Silberberg, 1978; Umbeck, 1980; Leffler, 1982; Kaempfer and Brastow, 
1985; Cowen and Tabarrok, 1995; James and Alston, 2002; Razzonlini, Shughart and 
Tollison, 2003). 
Most – though not all – of these articles focus on consumption rather than 
production decisions and none have addressed the time dimension of the quality-tax 
relationship. Many products, such as wine, aged cheese, cultured pearls, timber, and most 
crop and livestock production are characterized by multi-period production processes. 
We examine the effects of taxes on the quantity and quality decisions of competitive 
producers. The representative producer chooses the optimal quantity and quality to 
produce and sell. Quantity is determined in the initial production period, and quality is 
determined by the number of periods the good is aged prior to sale. The passage of time 
affects the value of the product, and a share of that value that is captured by the tax 
authority. 
                                                 
1 This result has been credited to the UCLA oral tradition prior to the publication of Alchian and Allen’s 
textbook (Borcherding and Silberberg, 1978). Returns to Aging    2 
In this paper, we develop a dynamic model of the producer’s profit-maximizing 
choices in the presence of a tax system. We evaluate four taxes: an ad valorem sales tax 
assessed as a percentage of price and collected on the date of sale; volumetric sales tax, 
or excise tax, assessed at a fixed rate per unit and collected on the date of sale; an ad 
valorem storage tax, or ad valorem accrual tax, assessed as a percentage of each period’s 
market value, and collected each period prior to sale; and a volumetric storage tax, or 
accrual excise tax, assessed at a fixed rate per unit collected each period prior to sale. 
Previous analyses of the Alchian-Allen effect have restricted attention to the ad valorem 
and volumetric sales taxes. 
We derive the effects of each tax instrument on the quantity and quality supplied, 
and obtain equivalency results regarding various two-tax systems. We find that an 
increase in any marginal tax rate unequivocally decreases quantity produced. Consistent 
with Alchian-Allen, an increase in a volumetric sales tax rate increases quality at the time 
of sale. However, because quality increases over time, an increase in the ad valorem sales 
tax rate can either increase or decrease quality at the time of sale, depending on the level 
of all tax rates and other parameters. Further, the Alchian-Allen dichotomy between ad 
valorem and volumetric taxes does not hold for storage taxes. An increase in either 
storage tax rate unequivocally decreases quality at the time of sale. 
Any two-tax system that includes a volumetric sales tax and any one of the three 
other taxes spans the quality/revenue feasible set. The supply side distortions of any tax 
system that results in a lower quality relative to the no-tax equilibrium can be mitigated 
by an alternative tax system that increases tax revenues, eliminates the quality distortion, Returns to Aging    3 
and does not increase the quantity distortion.  
A volumetric sales tax is distinguished from the other taxes considered here only 
because it permits the construction of a full range of two-tax schemes with positive taxes. 
If subsidies were permitted, then any tax system with two instruments could deliver the 
optimal quality level. Since direct subsidies of wine production on a per-unit basis are not 
typically observed in practice, such schemes would be of little practical interest. The 
exception to this rule is the European Union. While most of its subsidies are not on a per-
unit of wine basis, under the 2000 CAP reforms there is limited aid to private storage of 
wine (Corsi, Pomarici, and Sardone, 2004). 
Wine is a particularly interesting aged product to examine, for three reasons. First, 
several studies have examined the rate of return to holding wine over time, and 
established that there is a positive return to aging over at least a twenty-year time period 
for the subsets of wines they examine, although their conclusions regarding its rate of 
return relative to other assets differ (Krasker, 1979; Jaeger, 1981; Burton and Jacobsen, 
2001). Byron and Ashenfelter (1995) examine determinants of wine prices, and also find 
that there is a positive return to aging. Because most wine is drunk soon after its 
purchase, tax distortions affecting the producer’s aging decision potentially may have a 
large effect on social welfare. 
Second, taxes are an important share of the cost of wine in many countries. Wine 
taxes can be split into 3 broad categories. In order of decreasing importance, wine is 
subject to excise taxes, value-added and sales taxes, and import duties and other related 
taxes. Berger, and Anderson (1999) calculate that 16% of the average global cost of a Returns to Aging    4 
bottle of wine is attributable to excise taxes or their equivalent, 6% to sales/VAT taxes or 
their equivalent, and 1% to import duties. 
Wine tax systems vary widely across countries. For example, in the United States, 
wine is subject to a volumetric sales tax (excise tax) and an ad valorem sales tax at the 
federal level. Many states impose additional ad valorem sales taxes, and some tax 
business inventories, such as wine held by a winery. In Australia, wine is subject to an ad 
valorem sales tax and to an ad valorem storage tax, referred to as the Wine Equalization 
Tax (WET). In France, wine is subject to the Value Added Tax (VAT). Wine stocks are 
taxed with either an ad valorem storage tax, or a quasi-volumetric storage tax based on 
the wine’s initial declared value, which does not adjust for appreciation in wine value 
over time. Such variations across tax systems provides an empirical motivation for our 
analysis of quality-neutral tax systems and their equivalence across certain tax 
instruments. 
Third, wine and alcohol in general are generally taxed at a higher rate than most 
goods and services are. High taxes on alcohol are justified by the argument that there are 
large negative externalities due to alcohol consumption, and taxes force users to 
internalize these costs.
2  Beyond these costs, there is the question of the extent to which 
alcohol and wine taxes are not only correcting for negative externalities but are true “sin 
taxes” in the sense that alcohol consumption in wine or any other form is considered a 
                                                 
2 However, see Heien and Pittman (1989) for a critique of the methodology of studies of the public costs of 
alcohol abuse. They observe that in these studies private costs internalized by alcohol consumers are 
included in the calculations of costs borne by society at large.  Returns to Aging    5 
demerit good, and taxes are a means of deterrence. Roughly 40 to 45 percent of American 
adults consume no alcohol at all (Moulton, Spawton and Bourqui, 2001). In some cases, 
their decision is influenced by the belief that alcohol consumption is morally wrong. This 
suggests that there may be a moral component to wine taxation. Society as a whole, or 
certain, potentially influential, groups, may prefer an inefficient tax system in order to 
reduce wine consumption below the levels where taxes induce drinkers to internalize 
externalities. 
Our analysis provides a starting point for examining the validity of a true sin tax 
component in wine taxes. If a given tax system is efficient, then there is no sin tax 
component. On the other hand, if a given tax system is inefficient, then the possibility of 
a sin tax component cannot be rejected in our framework. In that event, one or more of 
our simplifying assumptions should be relaxed in order to ascertain whether the tax 
system continues to be inefficient, and, hence whether the possibility of a sin tax 
component continues to exist. 
Previous work has examined wine taxes. Tsolakis (1983), Buccola and 
VanderZanden (1997), and James and Alston (2002) have examined the empirical effects 
of wine-specific taxes but have not addressed the effects on aging and quality, or the 
difference between storage taxes and sales taxes. They also have not compared tax 
systems. Wohlgenant (1982) examines vintner aging decisions across vintages as an 
inventory problem, but does not consider taxes. Returns to Aging    6 
2. The Basic Model 
We assume a perfectly competitive market, so that the market price of wine at the date of 
sale is a perfect signal of quality.
3 We also invoke the small country assumption, and 
focus on the effects of taxes through wine prices and costs on a representative winery. 
Both the tax authority and the representative winery have rational expectations. The 
quantity of wine produced is determined at the initial date, t = 0, while quality is a 
function of the wine’s initial quality and the number of periods it is aged. 
Consider the problem of the production, aging, and ultimate sale of wine from a 
single crushing by a representative winery. The winery maximizes profits by choosing 
the quantity of wine produced, q, and by choosing the quality of the wine through 
choosing its sale date t. 
We denote the cost of production as c(q), the marginal cost of storage per unit of 
wine per period as ps, and the real discount rate as r. The realized profit from producing q 
units of wine at time 0 and aging the wine until its sale at date t is 
  () ( ) 1 ()
rt rt
s ep t qc q e p q r π
−− =− − − . (1) 
Maximizing π with respect to q implies 
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Equation (2) can be rewritten as 
                                                 
3 We therefore are abstracting from the potential asymmetric information issues that may arise between the 
producer and consumers. Returns to Aging    7 
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Equation (2') shows that the optimal quantity of wine q* is determined by where the 
marginal discounted present value of quantity equals the sum of the marginal cost of 
production and the discounted present value of the marginal cost of aging for all storage 
periods prior to its sale at t. We refer to q* as the firm’s first-best quantity. 
The firm chooses the age at which it sells the vintage according to the following 
profit-maximization condition: 
 () () s p tr p tp ′ = + . (3) 
That is, the firm sells the wine at time t when the marginal increase in value from holding 
the wine for an additional period is equal to the marginal cost of holding it: the 
opportunity cost of the money obtained from selling the wine at time t plus the marginal 
cost of storing the wine a little longer. Hereafter, we call this date of sale the firm’s first-
best age of wine, t*. We assume that t* is a unique global maximizer. 
3. Wine Taxes, Quantity, Quality, and Tax Revenue 
We now introduce taxes into the producer’s profit maximization problem, focusing on the 
comparative analyses of long-run responses to the different taxation schemes considered. 
We consider four taxes: an ad valorem sales tax, a volumetric sales tax, an ad valorem 
storage tax, and a volumetric storage tax. In all four cases, we assume that once the tax 
system has been designed and chosen, it remains in place unchanged throughout the 
producer’s planning horizon. An ad valorem sales tax is assessed as a fixed percentage of 
the market price, and collected when the vintner sells the wine. The discounted present Returns to Aging    8 
value of the tax paid at time t is  ( )
rt r
p ep t q τ
− , where  [0,1]
r
p τ ∈  is the ad valorem sales tax 
rate. A volumetric sales tax is assessed as a fixed monetary amount per unit volume and 
collected at sale. In this case, the discounted present value of the tax paid at time t is 
rt r
q eq τ
− , where  0
r
q τ ≥  is the volumetric valorem sales tax rate. An ad valorem storage 
tax is assessed as a fixed percentage of the market price of wine, p(t), and is collected 
continuously throughout the storage period.
4 The discounted present value of the total tax 
paid in this case is 
0 ()
t rx s
p e p x qdx τ
− ∫ , where  [0,1]
s
p τ ∈  is the ad valorem storage tax rate. 
A volumetric storage tax is assessed as a fixed monetary amount per unit volume and is 
collected continuously throughout the storage period. The discounted present value of the 
total tax paid is (1 ) /
rt s
q eq r τ
− − , where  0
s
q τ ≥  is the volumetric storage tax rate. 
After incorporating all four tax instruments, the vintner’s profit is 
 
0 () () ( 1 ) ( )
t rt r r rx s
pq p t e p t q e p x qdx πτ τ τ















For future use, given the tax regime  []
rrss
p qpq τ τττ ′ = τ  we define the effective tax 
rate per unit of wine as 
                                                 
4 We thus abstract away from tax collection costs and other complications associated with cases where the 
tax authority must continuously appraise the value of wine that has not yet been sold in order to collect ad 
valorem taxes. Returns to Aging    9 
 
() ()
0 () (() ) ()
t rt r r rx r r
pq p q ve p t e p x d x ττ τ τ
−− ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ =+ ++ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ∫
τ τ ττ , (5) 
and the value of total tax revenue as  () ()() R vq = τ ττ , where  () q τ  is the optimal choice 
for quantity and  () t τ  is the optimal age of wine. 
3.1 Quality Choice with Taxes 
In this section, we consider the effects of changes in the tax regime on the quality of wine 
produced. The firm’s optimal stopping rule for the age that maximizes the expected per-
unit value of the wine with respect to its date of sale is 
 ( 1 ) () ( 1 ) () ()
rr r s s
p pq s p q pt r pt p pt τ ττ τ τ ⎡⎤ ′ −= − − + + + ⎣⎦ . (6) 
Dividing through by (1 )
r














′ =+ + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
. (7) 
In the presence of taxes, the firm chooses t such that the marginal value of quality equals 
the marginal opportunity cost of waiting another period to sell then wine plus the cost of 
storage, plus the net effect of taxes on the returns to waiting. Equation (7) illustrates 
several important properties of these taxes. First, in this framework, the basic Alchian-
Allen effect holds for a volumetric retail tax: an increase in this tax increases the profit-










, (8) Returns to Aging    10 
where 
22 0 t t Δπ =∂ ∂ <  by the second-order condition for a unique maximum.
5 Second, 
the volumetric retail tax has the same qualitative effect on age/quality at sales as a 
decrease in storage costs does. Third, the Alchian-Allen dichotomy does not hold for a 
volumetric or an ad valorem storage tax. Both taxes unambiguously decrease the profit-






















,   (10) 
Fourth, an increase in either storage tax has the same qualitative effect on age/quality at 
sales as an increase in  storage costs. Fifth, the impact of ad valorem retail taxes on age is 






qsp q rs s







−++ + ∂ >> == ⇔ = + + << ∂−
. (11) 
Sixth, since the numerator of the parenthesized expression in (7) is linear in the tax rates, 
any given tax revenue objective can be achieved with different combinations of tax 
instruments. Finally, provided the second order condition for a unique maximum is met, 
the optimal choice for quality/age of wine exceeds, equals, or is less than the first-best 
age if and only if 
                                                 
5 This is equivalent to (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) []
rr s
pp p pt r pt ττ τ ′′ ′ −< − +. A sufficient condition for this to be satisfied for 
any tax system is that there exists a t0 satisfying  0 0 t < <∞ and  0 () 0 pt t t ′′ < ∀> . Returns to Aging    11 
  0
rr s s
qp sp q rp p ττ τ τ < −+ + +=
>
. (12) 
This result is illustrated in Figure 1. The figure plots  () p t ′  against the right-hand 
side of (7) in age-price space. The first-best age and price are obtained when 
() () s p tr p tp ′ =+ , and the net effect of the taxes on the first-best age of wine is zero. This 
outcome is where the curve labeled  () p t ′  intersects the line labeled  ( ) s rp t p + . The 
intersections of the other two curves with the  () p t ′  curve illustrate tax packages that 
distort age above and below its first-best level. When the effect of the volumetric sales 
tax is dominated by the joint effect of the other three taxes, then the profit-maximizing 
wine age exceeds the first-best age. When the effect of the volumetric sales tax dominates 
the joint effect of the other three taxes, then the profit-maximizing wine age is less than 
the  first-best age. 
3.2 Quantity Choice with Taxes 
Next, we consider the impacts of changes in the tax system on the vintner’s quantity 
choice. With an arbitrary tax system, the profit-maximizing quantity satisfies the first-
order condition, 
  (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
t rt r r rx s s






∂ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ′ =− − − ++ − = ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ∂ ∫ . (13) 
The second-order sufficient condition for a unique q is simply  () 0 cq ′′ > . To evaluate the 
comparative statics for q with respect to each of the taxes, we first need to evaluate the 
cross partial derivative, 
2 qt π ∂∂ ∂ . Differentiating the first-order condition for q with 
respect to t, we obtain Returns to Aging    12 
  {}
2
(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
rt r r r s s
pp q s p q ep t r p t p p t
qt
π
τ ττ τ τ
− ∂ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ′ =− − − − − ++ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ∂∂
. (14) 
From equations (3') and (7) above, we see that 
 ( 1 ) () ( 1 ) () () 0
rr r s s
pp q s p q pt r p t p pt ττ τ τ τ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ′ −− − − − + + = ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ . (15) 
The economic intuition for this separation property is straightforward. Once the 
producer has chosen how much wine to produce, each bottle of wine is simply an 
investment instrument. While the internal rate of return,  ( ) p t ′ , exceeds the marginal 
holding cost  ( ) s rp t p + , it is worthwhile to hold the bottle to capture the excess returns 
from further aging. This asset management decision is independent of the total quantity 
of wine that was produced at time t = 0. Hence, the firm’s profit function is separable 
between quantity and age. This property greatly simplifies the comparative statics for the 
effects of different tax instruments on the quantity produced. Indeed, an increase in any 


















































3.3 Age/Quality Neutral Tax Systems Returns to Aging    13 
The effects of individual tax instruments on the producer’s age/quality and quantity 
decisions has interesting implications for the design of multi-instrument tax schemes. All 
four taxes reduce the quantity supplied. Equivalently, the firm’s first-order condition for 
quantity implies that for a fixed age/quality outcome, any change in the tax system that 
increases the per unit tax rate,  ( ) v τ , decreases quantity,  ( ) q τ .
6 
The varying effects of individual tax instruments on the profit-maximizing choice 
of quality allows us to create a class of tax schemes that result in the first-best quality 
level. The first-order condition for the age/quality choice implies that there will be no 
age/quality distortion if and only if the tax system satisfies the condition 
  ( ) ()
rr s s
qs p p q rp p t τ ττ τ = ++ τ . (20) 
There are three possible two-tax systems with positive tax rates that do not distort 
the first best wine age: 
(1) retail taxes satisfying /
rr
qs p p r ττ = , so that  [ ] 1 10 0
r
ps pr τ τ=
T
 and 
  ( )
*
11 () ( * )
rt r
sp vv e r p t p r τ
− ≡≡ + τ ; 
(2) volumetric taxes satisfying  /
rs
qq r ττ = , so that  [ ] 2 01 / 01
s
q r τ τ=
T
 and 
  22 () /
s
q vv r τ ≡≡ τ ; and 
                                                 
6 Formally, let V(τ) denote the set of all non-vanishing vectors v such that the directional derivative of t 
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(3) volumetric retail tax and ad valorem storage tax satisfying  ( *) /
rs
qp p tr ττ = , so that 
[ ] 3 0( * ) /1 0
s





33 0 () ( * ) / ( )
t sr t r x
p vv ep tr ep x d x τ
−− ⎡ ⎤ ≡≡ + ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ∫ τ . 
Examining the effective tax rate v, we see that in each case it is linearly increasing in the 
other tax rate used to balance the volumetric retail tax to maintain age/quality neutrality. 
Therefore, an increase in each of these taxes increases v and decreases q. 
Now consider the relationship between tax rates and tax revenues for tax schemes 
that maintain age/quality neutrality. It follows from the definition of tax revenue, 













Thus, for all v ∈ V(τ), 
 














"( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( )
"( ( ))
cq q v v
cq
⎛⎞ −∂




Hence, maintaining age neutrality while increasing the tax rates in each two-tax system 
results in an increase, no change, or a decrease in tax revenue if and only if 
() () () () 0 cq q v
> ′′ −=
<
ττ τ . Since  ( ) 0 cq ′′ >  by assumption, for all cost functions that 
satisfy 
0




′′ = , the left-hand-side of this condition is strictly positive at τ = 0 and Returns to Aging    15 
q = q*, eventually vanishes as v increases, and then becomes negative as v increases 
further and quantity decreases. 
3.4 Tax Equivalence of the Two-Tax Age-Neutral Systems 
We establish tax equivalence among the three two-tax age-neutral systems by finding 
relationships that equate each pair of effective per unit tax rates. With no age/quality 
distortion, this relationship ensures that for any pair of tax equivalent systems, the 
quantity distortion and the tax revenue generated will be the same across tax schemes. 
Using the expressions for v1, v2 and v3 in the previous subsection, it is simple to show that 
the per unit taxes are equal,  123 vvv = = , if and only if the periodic payments from an 
associated perpetual annuity for each of 
s
q τ , 
r
p τ , and 
s
p τ are equal: 
  []
* **
0 (* ) (* ) ( )
t sr r t sr t r x
qp s p e r pt p e pt r e pxd x ττ τ
−− − ⎡ ⎤ =+ =+ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ∫ , (23) 
where, given the restriction to two taxes at any one time,  0
s
q τ >  only in the first case, 
0
r
p τ >  only in the second case, and  0
s
p τ >  only in the third age neutral two-tax case, 
respectively. 
These conditions are intuitively appealing. Consider the first expression. The 
volumetric storage tax is paid every period between production and sale, and is based on 
quantity rather than value. The net effect here of balancing a volumetric retail tax against 
a volumetric storage tax is a tax scheme that is equivalent to paying the storage tax 
s
q τ  on 
each unit of wine in perpetuity.  
Now consider the second expression. Because retail taxes are paid once after  * t  Returns to Aging    16 
time periods have elapsed, and because there is no age distortion,  ( *) ( *) s p tr p tp ′ =+ . 
Hence, the net effect of balancing a volumetric retail tax against an ad valorem retail tax 




− ′  
on each bottle of wine in perpetuity.  
Finally, consider the third expression. The first term reflects that the volumetric 
retail tax is delayed for t* periods, and is only paid once. The second identifies the 
instantaneous per period effects of the ad valorem storage tax. 
Thus, we have complete tax equivalence among three age-neutral two-tax 
systems. If we normalize on the ad valorem retail sales tax, then for any  0
r
p τ >  the tax-
equivalent systems are defined by 
  1 [1 / 0 0]
r
ps pr τ × τ=
T, (24) 
  [ ]
*
2 [( * ) ]01 / 01
rr t








[( * ) ]
0( * ) /1 0














4. Optimal Revenue Generating Tax Systems 





τ  if and only if  () () 0
rr s s
qp s p q rp p t ττ τ τ < −+ + + =
>
τ . Differentiating the effective tax 





qs q p rt
r
p





− ⎛⎞ −++ + ∂
= ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ∂ − ⎝⎠
. (27) Returns to Aging    17 
This shows that the effective tax rate increases, remains unchanged, or decreases with 
age/quality as the age of wine at the date that it is sold is less than, equal to, or greater 
than the first-best age of wine. Since there is no interaction between quantity and quality, 
tax revenues achieve a relative maximum with respect to age/quality at the first-best age 
level. In this sense, the age neutral tax systems analyzed in the previous section play a 
pivotal role in our analysis of optimal tax systems. 




















  () ()
v
vc q q d qq d t
t
∂ ′′ =− +
∂
. (28) 
Therefore, the trade-off between quality and quantity along an iso-revenue locus has 
slope 




rt r r s s
R qp s p q
cq qv dt






⎡ ⎤ −+ + + ⎣ ⎦
. (29) 
Recalling that  ( ) 0 0 cq q ′′ >∀≥ and assuming that 
0




′′ = , the numerator of (29) 
is positive for small effective tax rates. As the tax rate increases, quantity decreases, and 
the numerator of (29) becomes smaller, and eventually becomes negative.
7 On the other 
                                                 
7 Define δ as the proportion of the total value of wine sold that is taken by all governments in the form of 
taxes, so that vp =δ . Then the numerator of (31) is positive, zero or negative as the price elasticity of Returns to Aging    18 
hand, the denominator is positive if  * tt < , zero if  * tt = , and negative if  * tt > . These 
two properties imply that the revenue function for any tax system has the same general 
shape and level curves as Figure 2, which depicts the case of an ad valorem sales tax and 
volumetric sales tax two-tax system. 
Examining Figure 2, note that when quantity and quality are below the first-best 
levels, but in a neighborhood of the no-tax equilibrium, the iso-revenue curves are 
positively sloped. As quantity and quality both fall along an iso-revenue curve with an 
increase in the effective tax rate, v, the slope of the iso-revenue curve ultimately becomes 
infinite and then negative. As we progress along the same iso-revenue curve, increasing 
quality but continuing to decrease quantity, we return to the age-neutral point and a zero-
slope point on the iso-revenue curve. Continuing further along this same iso-revenue 
curve by increasing both quality and quantity we reach another point with an infinite 
slope where quality is greater than the first best choice, but quantity is lower. Finally by 
increasing quantity and decreasing quality from this point onward to the original position 
at the first-best levels of both quantity and quality, we complete an oval or egg-shaped 
iso-revenue locus. 
Figure 3 illustrates that non-negative tax rates is not a binding constraint on the 
above propositions. A formal comparative statics analysis readily verifies that a full range 
                                                                                                                                                 
quantity supplied,  ( ) ()
q
p pcq q ′′ ε= , is less than, equal to, or greater than 1/δ . Wine taxes currently 
account for roughly 25% of the total value of the wine sold worldwide, so that 1/ 4 δ≈ . Information 
contained in James and Alston (2002) implies that the supply elasticity of wine is something less than 2. 
Taken together, these two conditions imply that the numerator of (31) is strictly positive, at least for the 
typical current tax system imposed on the wine market. Returns to Aging    19 
of feasible positive tax revenues can be generated with any two-tax system that includes a 
volumetric retail sales tax. These revenues also can be supported by positive tax rates and 
at least as high quality wine as the firm’s first best no-tax quality level. 
Based on this analysis, we conclude the following: first, the firm’s first best with 
respect to quality is a relative maximum of tax revenues for all quantity choices; second, 
every positive tax revenue can be supported by a two-tax system that accommodates the 
first best quality outcome; and third, if the tax system results in a quality outcome that is 
less than the firms first-best (no tax) quality choice, then more tax revenue can be raised 
with a smaller quantity distortion and the complete elimination of the quality/age 
distortion. 
5. Conclusions 
We have analyzed the supply side effects of taxes on the quantity and quality of goods 
whose market values accrue with age, such as wine. We have shown that a two-tax 
system that includes a volumetric sales tax and any one of three other taxes—an ad 
valorem sales tax, an ad valorem storage tax, or a volumetric storage tax—spans the 
quality/revenue feasible set. We also derived tax equivalence for the three possible two-
tax systems. The producer’s first best quality also is a local tax revenue maximizing 
choice for any feasible tax system. Moreover, any tax system that reduces quality relative 
to the market equilibrium with no taxes could increase tax revenues and reduce the 
quality distortion without increasing the quantity distortion. Returns to Aging    20 
References 
Alchian, A. A. and W.R. Allen. University Economics. Wadsworth Publishing Co. 
(Belmont, California, 1964). 
Anderson, K. “Where in the World is the Wine Industry Going?" Opening Plenary Paper 
for the Annual Conference of the Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Society, Adelaide, South Australia, January 2001. 
Barzel, Y. “An Alternative Approach to the Analysis of Taxation.” Journal of Political 
Economy. 84,6 (December, 1976):1177-1197. 
Berger, N. and K. Anderson, “Consumer and Import Taxes in the World Wine Market: 
Australia in International Perspective." Australian Agribusiness Review, 7 (June 
1999). 
Borcherding, T.E. and E. Silberberg. “Shipping the Good Apples Out: The Alchian and 
Allen Theorem Reconsidered.” Journal of Political Economy. 86,1 (February, 1978): 
131-138. 
Buccola, S. T. and L. VanderZanden. “Wine Demand, Price Strategy, and Tax Policy.” 
Review of Agricultural Economics 19, 2 (Fall-Winter 1997): 428-40. 
Burton, B.J. and J.P. Jacoby. “The Rate of Return on Investment in Wine.” Economic 
Inquiry. 39,3(July, 2001):337-350. 
Byron, R.P. and O.Ashenfelter. “Predicting the Quality of an Unborn Grange.” Economic 
Record. 71,212 (March, 1995):40-53. 
Corsi, A., E. Pomarici, and R. Sardone. “Italy.” Chapter 4 in The World’s Wine Markets: 
Globalization at Work. K Anderson, editor. Edgar Elgar Publishing (Northampton, Returns to Aging    21 
MA, 2004). 
Cowen, T. and A. Tabarrok. “Good Grapes and Bad Lobsters: Applying the Alchian and 
Allen Theorem.” Economic Inquiry. 33(April, 1995):253-256. 
Gould, J. P. and J. Segall. “The Substitution Effects of Transportation Costs.” Journal of 
Political Economy. 77,1(January-February, 1969):130-137. 
Heien, D.M. and D.J. Pittman. “The Economic Costs of Alcohol Abuse: An Assessment 
of Current Methods and Estimates.”  Journal of Studies on Alcohol. 50 (November, 
1989):567-579. 
Jaeger, E. “To Save or Savor: The Rate of Return to Storing Wine.” Journal of Political 
Economy. 89,3 (June, 1981):584-592. 
James, J. S. and J. M. Alston. “Taxes and Quality: A Market-Level Analysis.” Australian 
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 46, 3 (2002): 417-43. 
Kaempfer, W. H. and R.T. Brastow. “The Effect of Unit Fees on the Consumption of 
Quality.” Economic Inquiry. 23,2 (April, 1985):341-348. 
Krasker, W.S. “The Rate of Return to Storing Wines.” Journal of Political Economy. 
87,6 (December, 1979): 1363-1367. 
Leffler, K. B. “Ambiguous Changes in Product Quality.” American Economic Review 72, 
5 (1982): 956-967. 
Moulton, K. S., A. L. Spawton and M Bourqui. “Introduction: Consumer Behavior and 
Marketing Strategies.” Chapter 1 in K. S. Moulton and J. T. Lapsley, ed. Successful 
Wine Marketing. Gaithersburg, MD: Aspen Publishers, Inc., 2001. 
Razzolini, L., W.F. Shughart II, and R.D. Tollison. “On the Third Law of Demand.” Returns to Aging    22 
Economic Inquiry. 41,2 (April,2003):292-298. 
Tsolakis, D. “Taxation and Consumption of Wine.” Review of Marketing and 
Agricultural Economics 51, 2 (August 1983): 155-65. 
Umbeck, J. “Shipping the Good Apples Out: Some Ambiguities in the Interpretation of 
‘Fixed Change’.” Journal of Political Economy 88, 1 (1980): 1990208. 
Wohlgenant, M. K. “Inventory Adjustment and Dynamic Winery Behavior.” American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics; 64, 2 (May 1982): 222-31. 
 age
$/unit
Figure 1. Quality Choice With and Without Taxes.
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Figure 3. Feasible Tax Outcomes with Positive Tax Rates.
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